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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
and merchantable title. There were twenty-four lots in the
square involved, and the original possessor went into possession
of the whole square although he had acquired only nineteen
of them. As to the five lots here in question, he took possession
as agent for the bank in which he was employed. The evidence
that later "he took that property as his own" was not enough
to change his precarious possession (for another) into a legal
possession (for himself) which is indispensable for any acquisi-
tive prescription." Of significant value in deciding future cases
is the court's clarification of the criteria that he "could not
become an adverse possessor in the absence of a showing that
he manifested such an intention by some unequivocal act of




In two cases the court was requested to give recognition
to the custody decree of another jurisdiction, and in both in-
stances this was refused. One was a foreign-country judgment
rendered in Panama, and the other was a sister-state judgment
from Tennessee. In the latter case, even the "full faith and
credit" clause offered no help. Custody decrees frequently fail
to finish the family fights for the offspring, because the desire
of one parent for its child is not dissipated by a judicial award
to the other. At the same time, courts usually seek a solution
in the best interests of the children. In a conflict of laws case
involving movement from one place to another, the question is
kept open by non-recognition of the custody decree previously
rendered in another jurisdiction. If, according to the general
principles of conflict of laws, the court which rendered the cus-
tody decree did not have jurisdiction to do so, the refusal to
recognize is simple enough. It is a little more involved but not
much more difficult to disregard the custody decree even of a
sister state and even where there may have been present all
the elements for jurisdiction.
10. Arts. 3436, 3441, 3446, 3489, 490, 3510, LA. CIVI CODE of 1870.
11. 224 La. 9, 14, 68 So.2d 739, 741 (1953).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
[VOL. XV
WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT
An illustration of the former is Francis v. Carpenter,' where
the plaintiff had obtained a divorce with custody and alimony
from a court in the Republic of Panama. The father and chil-
dren were not in Panama at the time of this decree, and some
years later one son, then aged seventeen, left his father's domi-
cile in Louisiana and went to live with his mother at her domi-
cile in Virginia. The mother's suit in Louisiana for alimony to
support this child, based on a request for recognition of the
Panama judgment, was dismissed. The situation would have
been quite different if the mother had instituted an ordinary
suit to seek custody and alimony, thereby submitting the ques-
tion to the jurisdiction of the Louisiana court-and this possi-
bility is expressly kept open in the decision. But to demand
recognition of a custody and alimony decree from a foreign
country which had no jurisdiction in the international (or con-
flict of laws) sense, was predestined to be a vain gesture.
The problem of a sister-state custody decree appeared in
the case of State ex rel. Huhn v. Huhn.2 While all the parties
lived in Tennessee, a court of that state rendered a divorce
dissolving the marriage and awarding custody to the father
of the children. The mother was given the privilege of having
them for weekend visits, and both parents were enjoined from
taking the children out of the jurisdiction of the court. When
the father took the children to live in Louisiana, the mother
obtained a modification order in Tennessee holding him in con-
tempt and awarding custody to her. By habeas corpus pro-
ceedings in Louisiana, the mother sought recognition of her
Tennessee custody decree, but the favorable action of the dis-
trict court was reversed in a holding that the Tennessee order
was not entitled to compulsory recognition in Louisiana.
Since the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Federal Con-
stitution requires only that a sister-state judgment be given
the same faith and credit that is accorded to it in the state of
its rendition, it is asking too much of Louisiana to recognize
a custody decree which is not final but subject to modification
in Tennessee. Furthermore, even if final and conclusive under
the conditions existing at the time of the award, subsequent
facts and circumstances have been considered sufficient by the
United States Supreme Court to authorize a reexamination of
1. 224 La. 916, 71 So.2d 326 (1954).
2. 224 La. 591, 70 So.2d 391 (1954).
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the merits.3 The present decision follows the holding in the
recent Louisiana case of State ex rel. Girtman v. Ricketson.4
Although the wife's modified Tennessee custody decree was
obtained in the absence of the husband and the children, the
order may well have been considered in Tennessee as a further
proceeding in the original action, so that the court would be
deemed to have continuous jurisdiction.5 Under such circum-
stances there would be no point in citing May v. Anderson,6
where the court which awarded the custody to one parent had
no personal jurisdiction whatsoever over the other parent.
If, in either of the two cases here discussed, the Louisiana
Supreme Court had felt that it would be in the best interests
of the administration of justice to recognize the foreign custody
decree, their action might have been surprising but it would
not be subject to any constitutional review for accepting volun-
tarily a foreign judgment which they were not compelled to
recognize under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
MINERAL RIGHTS
Harriet S. Daggett*
In Smith v. Holt1 it was most logically decided that when
the same lessee, owner, under definition given in the Conserva-
tion Act, was operating a drilling unit established by the com-
missioner, an order for pooling was unnecessary. Thus, drilling
on one part of the unit was user as to all, though two different
servitudes were involved, and the land covered by one had not
been used.
In Barnsdall Oil Co. v. Succession of Miller,2 the evidence
disclosed no intention on the part of the landowners to sign a
joint contract of lease with the servitude owners. Indeed, it
was found that the landowners did not know that the servitude
owners were to be parties to the lease. Thus, there was no
3. New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947).
4. 221 La. 691, 60 So.2d 88 (1952). See The Work o the Louisiana Su-
preme Court for the 1951-1952 Te'rm-Conflict of Laws, 13 LOUISIANA LAW
REVIEW 230, 234 (1953); Note, 27 TULANE L. REV. 361 (1953).
5. Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, 228 U.S. 346 (1913).
6. 345 U.S. 528 (1953), 14 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEW 683 (1954).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 223 La. 821, 67 So.2d 93 (1953), 14 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 438 (1954).
2. 224 La. 216, 69 So.2d 21 (1953).
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